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FROM START TO FINISH: A HISTORICAL 
REVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 
TREATIES AND STARTING OVER WITH THE 
NEW START 
Lisa M. Schenck* & Robert A. Youmans** 
[O]n August 6, [1945,] a new weapon exploded over 
Hiroshima.  Its stupendous power, shattering old concepts of 
war and weaponry, imposed new urgencies and demanded new 
perspectives on international efforts to control armaments. 
The first U.S. proposal for the control of nuclear weapons 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rather than commencing with the U.S. bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear age actually began on the 
morning of July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, with the 
detonation of the world’s first nuclear weapon in the so-called 
Trinity Explosion.2  That test validated the design and 
functionality of the plutonium implosion device,3 nicknamed “Fat 
Man” because of the round shape of the bomb casing.4  The 
Trinity Explosion produced a 21-kiloton blast, the equivalent of 
exploding 21,000 tons of TNT.5  On August 9, 1945, less than one 
month after the Trinity Explosion, a Fat Man implosion bomb was 
dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, killing an estimated 40,000 people.6  
This bombing, combined with the use of the “Little Boy” uranium 
bomb against Hiroshima three days earlier, killed approximately 
110,000 people and led to the end of World War II in the Pacific 
theater.7  The explosion over Hiroshima,8
 
 2 HARRY A. GAILEY, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO 
BAY 479 (1995). 
 and the subsequent 
 3 See F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: MAKING 
THE ATOMIC BOMB 91-92 (2010), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/The_Man 
hattan_Project_2010.pdf. 
 4 See id. at 83 (stating that the Fat Man was “named after Winston Churchill”). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id.; see GAILEY, supra note 2, at 488, 490. 
SCHENCK & YOUMANS_Article (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2012  2:39 PM 
2012] NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL & NEW START 401 
detonation on Nagasaki, catalyzed global collective action to 
address nuclear arms control.  Unfathomable dimensions of 
potential destruction transformed the concepts of waging war and 
maintaining peace,9
Over the past six and a half decades, the world has watched as 
global powers negotiated arms control, grappling with this lethal 
international issue.  Nuclear arms control negotiations from 1925 
to 2010 can be segmented into distinct periods reflecting different 
approaches to the threat of nuclear arms.  Six stages can be 
distinguished by their evolving focused objectives: 
 and the public understood the risks. 
(1) 1925–1958, concentrating on comprehensive disarmament; 
(2) 1959–1968, attempting to implement partial measures to 
achieve nuclear arms control; 
(3) 1969–1979, holding bilateral talks (enhancing stability, as 
well as maintaining world order and non-proliferation); 
(4) 1980–1991, involving reassessment and repositioning by 
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(U.S.S.R. or Soviet Union);10
(5) 1991–2009, a period of uncertainty caused by the impact of 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution on the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START) and corresponding treaties;
 
11
(6) 2009–present, encompassing the most recent 
 and 
 
 8 In a public statement on August 6, 1945, President Truman informed the public: 
That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T.  It had more than two 
thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the 
largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare. . . . With this bomb we 
have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to 
supplement the growing power of our armed forces. . . . It is the atomic bomb.  
It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. 
White House Press Release on Hiroshima, August 6, 1945: Statement by the President of the 
United States, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
NUCLEAR POLICIES FROM THE DISCOVERY OF FISSION TO THE PRESENT 64-65 (Philip L. 
Cantelon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991). 
 9 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 1. 
 10 See H.R. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL, 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & SCIENCE, 99TH CONG., FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR 
ARMS CONTROL: PART I—NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY 
IX-X (Comm. Print 1985) (prepared by the Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter 
1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT] (setting forth a similar break down of time 
periods, asserting that 1957 to 1968 was a comprehensive disarmament period, 1969 to 
1979 reflected arms control through partial measures, and 1980 to 1984 was a period of 
reassessing and repositioning by the United States and U.S.S.R.). 
 11 See, e.g., George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the 
Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 323 (1993). 
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developments since the expiration of the START Treaty.12
This Article provides a historical review, describing nuclear arms 
control agreements that helped diminish the nuclear arms threat 
and build up. 
 
Even as negotiations were occurring, the United States and 
the Soviet Union began a nuclear arms race, with each striving to 
gain a military advantage over the other by building more and 
more nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.  This race 
led to a debate about the appropriate means to deal with the 
nuclear arms problem—i.e., arms control.  Essentially, collective 
arms control responses from 1925 to 1991 evolved into three types 
of agreements, which focused on: (1) non-armament; (2) 
confidence-building measures; and (3) arms limitations.13
After 1991, the focus became arms reduction, which initially 
began as a bilateral measure, but has since become multilateral 
due to the Soviet Union’s dissolution.  As the United States and 
Soviet Union came to realize that their vast expenditures on 
nuclear weapons were not making either side safer from the other, 
both parties were drawn to the negotiating table in the late 1960s 
to discuss limits on strategic nuclear weapons.
 
14  These 
negotiations resulted in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) Treaties,15
 
 12 The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009.  See Comparison of the START 
Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 
8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139901.htm. 
 which later led to the START Treaties—the 
latest iteration of which is the New START Treaty.  The relative 
merits of the New START Treaty were debated at great length 
during the ratification process in the United States and in the 
Russian Federation.  This Article describes how we arrived at this 
point in the global efforts to regulate nuclear weapons, how each 
approach differed and was built on previous experience, the 
impact of world events on negotiations and the resultant pressure 
on the parties to achieve agreement, and what we can expect in the 
future of nuclear arms control. 
 13 These categories reflect those presented in the 1985 Congressional Nuclear Arms 
Control Report.  See id. at IX-XIII. 
 14 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES 24, 25-27 (1985). 
 15 See id. at 27-32. 
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II.  1925–1958: COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT FOCUS 
Prior to 1945 and the nuclear era, global collective agreements 
regarding disarmament and arms control primarily resulted from 
constraints imposed upon the defeated by victors, rather than 
mutually-negotiated agreements.16  From 1926 to 1934, 
disarmament discussions (including the League of Nations-
sponsored multilateral general disarmament conferences) revolved 
around the reduction of weapons and armed forces 
(predominantly naval), and the diminution of poison gas use (such 
as in World War I) and bacteriological weapons.17  Prior to World 
War II, these diplomatic efforts to reduce and limit arms 
established a multilateral diplomatic structure, which included 
several major powers controlling global political influence, relied 
on agendas that focused on comprehensive disarmament, but 
actually resulted in participants’ weaponry growing in size, 
sophistication, and lethality.18
Following the 1945 nuclear detonation in Hiroshima, arms 
control and disarmament proposals included stipulations regarding 
the timing of disarmament—i.e., the pace and order for 
eliminating weapons—and reduction of armed forces without a 
corresponding weakening of any one nation’s security.
 
19  The 
world grappled with “[t]he inherent difficulty of promoting the 
peaceful uses of the atom, without easing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, [which] ultimately led the Truman 
administration to propose the Baruch [P]lan . . . .”20
In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the U.S. representative to the U.N. 
Atomic Energy Commission, presented a plan to place the world’s 
atomic resources under the purview of an independent 




 16 See ACDA, supra note 
  According to the 
proposal, the International Atomic Development Authority would 
have exclusive control or ownership of atomic resources 
1, at 1. 
 17 See id. at 1-2. 
 18 See Joseph Keith Lyou, The Social Psychology of U.S.-Soviet Arms Control 
Negotiations: The Role and Experience of the U.S. Negotiator and Delegation 11-13 
(June 1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Lyou Dissertation]. 
 19 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 3. 
 20 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: 
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 2 (2003). 
 21 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 2. 
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production—mining to manufacturing—and destruction.22  The 
Baruch Plan further proposed that the United States—the only 
country possessing such weapons—relinquish its atomic arsenal 
and secrets to the independent authority, which would inspect all 
nation parties23 willing to destroy existing bombs and stop 
manufacturing weapons.24  Essentially, the Baruch Plan called on 
the United States to abandon “its nuclear weapons program after 
all other states agreed to accept international control over their 
nuclear programs.”25  The Soviet Union, however, declined to 
hand over its “atomic future” to a majority vote of the U.N. 
Security Council26 and opposed the staging, ownership, and 
enforcement provisions of the Baruch Plan.27
In the years following World War II, technological 
advancements continued and nuclear weapons changed.  Larger, 
more powerful nuclear weapons were developed and mating them 
to ballistic missiles provided greater range, accuracy, and throw-
weight.
 
28  Perhaps most alarming, the number of nations 
possessing these fearsome weapons increased, first evidenced by 
the Soviet Union’s detonation of a nuclear weapon on August 29, 
1949.29
The “deterrence” theory of arms control has its foundation in 
a somewhat odd notion—i.e., treating the U.S.–U.S.S.R. nuclear 
arms race as a method to maintain peace.
  Thus, Cold War rivals, the United States and Soviet 
Union, began their infernal race to develop weapons that were 
more lethal and deployed by more advanced weapon-delivery 
systems.  By 1953, these rivals owned and had exploded hydrogen 
bombs, thus initiating the nuclear arms race. 
30
 
 22 See id. 
  In 1954, Secretary of 
 23 Id. at 3. 
 24 See THE AMERICAN ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POLICIES 
FROM THE DISCOVERY OF FISSION TO THE PRESENT 70 (Philip L. Cantelon et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 1991) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN ATOM]. 
 25 GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 26 See THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 70. 
 27 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 28 For a discussion of the concept of throw-weight, see NOTBURGA K. CALVO-
GOLLER & MICHEL A. CALVO, THE SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTENT–APPLICATION–
VERIFICATION 56 (1987). 
 29 See MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N FOR ATOMIC ENERGY & MINISTRY OF DEF. 
OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N, USSR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR 
EXPLOSIONS: 1949 THROUGH 1990, at 11 tbl.3 (V. N. Mikhailov et al. eds., 1996), http:// 
npc.sarov.ru/english/issues/peaceful/peaceful_e.pdf; see also ACDA, supra note 1, at 3. 
 30 THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 194. 
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State John Foster Dulles established the doctrine of massive 
retaliation as the basis to deter war and Soviet aggression, 
“whereby the United States would maintain peace by maintaining 
its ability to respond to a nuclear attack or any other form of 
aggression with an all-out nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union.”31  
Although nations throughout the world remained apprehensive 
about possible proliferation (the expanding possession of 
weapons), concern also existed regarding the testing of nuclear 
weapons and the risk of radioactive debris and accidents, whether 
caused by human error or miscalculation, mechanical failure or 
malfunction, or an unauthorized or misinterpreted action.32
From 1956 to 1962, the United States (through the Atoms for 
Peace program) supplied peaceful nuclear technology—such as 
research reactors, training, and fissionable material—to twenty-six 
developing and friendly nations.
 
33  In return, the recipient nations 
fulfilled U.S.-required safeguards, such as having inspectors 
continually monitor the transferred technology to ensure its 
peaceful use.34  Nevertheless, until 1959, negotiations primarily 
focused on comprehensive disarmament, with the United Nations’ 
global leadership and Presidents Truman (1945–1952) and 
Eisenhower (1953–1960) at the helm for the United States.  
However, negotiations did not result in any formal international 
arms control agreements during the period 1945–1958.35
III.  1959–1968: PARTIAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS ARMS CONTROL 
 
From the late 1950s to 1960s, global arms control negotiations 
shifted their focus from the generalized commitment to 
comprehensive disarmament (i.e., disarming the world) to the 
more focused approach of deterrence (i.e., preventing use of 
nuclear weapons).  With the development of intercontinental 
 
 31 Id. at 193. 
 32 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 88. 
 33 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Lyou Dissertation, supra note 18, at 14.  Lyou discusses the various events that 
stalled negotiations: 
The Berlin Blockade, the Czechoslovakian coup, the Truman Doctrine, the 
first Soviet atomic weapons test, the communist takeover in China, the Korean 
War, the development of the hydrogen bomb, McCarthyism, and the 
successful launching of Sputnik I all contributed to, and were the result of, 
heightened post-war contentiousness between the nascent superpowers. 
Id. at 14-15. 
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ballistic missiles in the late 1950s came reduced delivery time for 
strategic weapons (from hours to minutes), and a modified U.S. 
political position from deterrence of war to avoidance of Soviet 
aggression.36
By 1964, the arms race between the United States and Soviet 
Union reached a point at which curtailment became necessary.  
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, France, and People’s Republic 
of China had already tested nuclear weapons, and dozens of others 
nations had the potential capability to develop these lethal 
weapons.
 
37  The need for accountability for nuclear materials 
production, and the possibility of illegal stockpiles or concealed 
weapons-manufacturing sites, highlighted the benefits of flexibility 
and practicality in negotiations.38  Consequently, attempts at 
negotiating limited or partial measures became the primary focus 
of negotiations.  This focus was predicated on an underlying hope 
that gradual progress toward complete disarmament could be 
accomplished by limiting the scope of agreements (thereby 
dividing the nuclear arms threat into “pieces”).39
From this point on, arms control negotiations progressed in 
three areas.  A 1985 Congressional Report, The Fundamentals of 
Nuclear Arms Control, astutely categorized nuclear arms control 
agreements into three categories: (1) non-armament agreements, 
which limit militarization from certain areas; (2) confidence-
building measures, which reduce the risk of war; and (3) arms-
limitation agreements, which constrain development, testing, and 
deployment of nuclear weapons technologies.
 
40
A.  Non-Armament Agreements 
 
During the period from 1959 to 1968, multilateral negotiations 
resulted in several non-armament agreements.  In 1959, for 
example, the multilateral Antarctic Treaty established a non-
armament agreement which demilitarized the Antarctic, rendering 
the area off-limits for any but peaceful purposes.  Such non-
armament treaties were “designed to keep free of conflict and 
 
 36 See THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 194. 
 37 GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 38 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
 39 See id. 
 40 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at IX-X.  The authors 
have adopted these categories from the 1985 Congressional Nuclear Arms Control Report 
for use in this Article. 
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nuclear weaponry the environments that science ha[d] made newly 
accessible and significant, and whose resources must be preserved 
for all—for example, outer space or the seabed—or geographic 
regions where nuclear weapons ha[d] not been introduced—
Antarctica and Latin America.”41  The Antarctic Treaty was 
followed by the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967 
(prohibiting the introduction, use, and threat of use of nuclear 
weapons in Latin America), the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
(prohibiting the presence and use of weapons of mass destruction 
in outer space and limiting the moon to peaceful uses), and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 (maintaining the 
non-nuclear-weapon status of nations).42
The Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967 (also 
known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was the first of the nuclear-
weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaties.
  Each of these 
agreements focused on keeping certain areas free of armaments.  
The parties to them attempted to restrict the expansion of nuclear 
arms to certain geographical areas, and thereby fulfilled a sub-
issue within the overall threat of nuclear arms and the generalized 
goal of complete disarmament. 
43
[T]o enhance international regulation of nuclear arms by 
establishing geographical regions wherein the testing, 
possession, and stationing of nuclear weapons are 
prohibited. . . . [to] reduce the likelihood that states in th[at] 
  Such agreements were 
designed: 
 
 41 ACDA, supra note 1, at 4. 
 42 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at X.  The NPT “called for 
non-nuclear-weapon states to forgo development of nuclear weapons and to expose their 
nuclear power facilities to international safeguards and inspections.”  Id.  Although parties 
to the NPT included many nations: 
The continued absence of two nuclear weapons states (the [People’s Republic 
of China] and France), the one previously nonnuclear power to subsequently 
conduct a known nuclear test (India), and a number of potential nuclear 
powers (including Libya, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa, 
Argentina, and Brazil) from the group of nations committed to the treaty . . . 
limit[ed] its effectiveness. 
Id.  In 1977, the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (U.S.–IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement), a follow-on to the NPT, described the process of selecting U.S. 
facilities in which to apply the full regime of IAEA safeguards procedures, including 
routine inspections.  See ACDA, supra note 1, at 163. 
 43 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 3-4, 41.  The Latin American NWFZ 
treaty was followed by the South Pacific NWFZ treaty in 1985, Southeast Asia in 1995, 
and Africa in 1996.  See id. at 41. 
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region[] will be compelled to seek nuclear weapons in response 
to a neighbor, thereby decreasing their probability of becoming 
involved in a nuclear war.44
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. has called the NWFZ treaty 
process “a regional security idea to limit the risk that others near 
you may obtain nuclear arms”
 
45 and “the back-door route toward 
the elimination of nuclear weapons.”46
On July 1, 1968, the United States signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
 
47  The NPT represented the first 
major effort by the international community of nations to limit the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Article VII of the 
treaty, for example, authorized states to establish NWFZs in their 
territories.48  By the early 1960s, there were five declared nuclear 
powers—the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, 
China, and France—and growing international concern that this 
number could increase.49  The NPT, which entered into force on 
March 5, 1970, recorded the “bargain”50 between the declared 
nuclear states and the non-nuclear states: the declared nuclear 
states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear 
states,51 while at the same time working towards the goal of 
eventual nuclear disarmament;52 the non-nuclear states agreed not 
to acquire nuclear weapons53
 
 44 Id. at 41. 
 and to accept full-scope safeguards 
 45 Interview with Thomas Graham, Jr., Ambassador to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), in Bethesda, Md. (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Graham Interview] 
(Ambassador Graham’s professional history also includes: Legal Advisor to the U.S. 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Delegation (1974–79), Senior Arms Control 
Agency Representative to the U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Delegation (1981–
82), Legal Advisor to the U.S. Nuclear and Space Arms Delegation (1985–88), and the 
Senior Arms Control Agency Representative and Legal Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to 
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Negotiation (1989–90), and 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the NPT Review Conference (1980)). 
 46 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS 
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2002). 
 47 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. 
 48 See id. art. VII. 
 49 See William Epstein, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Review Conferences: 1965 
to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 855-62 
(Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993). 
 50 See Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/ 
isn/npt/index.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
 51 See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 47, art. I. 
 52 See id. art. VI. 
 53 See id. art. II. 
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on all their peaceful nuclear activities and facilities.54  While the 
number of nuclear weapon states—both declared and 
undeclared—has increased since 1970, the NPT remains the 
cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread 
of nuclear weapons and, with over 180 parties, it is the most widely 
adhered-to arms control agreement in history.55
In the NPT itself, the parties further restrained nuclear arms 
expansion by prohibiting countries from spreading nuclear 
weapons technology.  The parties negotiated the NPT due to U.S. 
and Soviet concerns regarding China’s nuclear weapons testing.
 
56  
Non-weapons states saw nuclear weapon capability as the 
“ultimate indicia of respect” as a “powerful” or “big” world 
power.57  To achieve a consensus, weapon states had to entice the 
non-weapon states with a balanced commitment that would 
eliminate the political attractiveness of possession of the weapons 
themselves.58  Article VI of the NPT was that key provision, 
requiring the leading “proliferation concern”—i.e., the United 
States—to ultimately relinquish its nuclear arms program.59  
Although the five nuclear weapons states promised in Article VI 
to negotiate to end the arms race, reduce nuclear armaments, and 
eliminate the nuclear arsenals,60 this was not the crucial bargaining 
provision.  The overall objective to eliminate the nuclear program 
of the key arms leader, the United States, was more important and 
there has been consistent support for this goal with each 
Presidential Administration.61
With this multilateral agreement, non-nuclear weapon states 
 
 
 54 See id. art. III. 
 55 See LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMM’N, 
ARTICLE IV OF THE NPT: BACKGROUND, PROBLEMS, SOME PROSPECTS (2004), 
available at http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No5.pdf. 
 56 Interview with Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Board Member, Dep’t of Def. Policy Bd., in 
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Blechman Interview] (former Assistant 
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1977), Deputy Chairman of 
the U.S. Delegation for Negotiations on Arms Transfers, and Member of the Commission 
to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld Commission 1998)). 
 57 Graham Interview, supra note 45; GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 327. 
 58 Graham Interview, supra note 45. 
 59 Blechman Interview, supra note 56. 
 60 GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2. 
 61 Blechman Interview, supra note 56.  This provision has been the subject of some 
controversy.  For example, even though the United States has not conducted nuclear arms 
testing since 1992, and by 2012 will have reduced its arsenal by 80%, some contend that 
the United States has not fulfilled its obligation to eliminate the nuclear weapons program.  
Id. 
SCHENCK & YOUMANS_Article (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2012  2:39 PM 
410 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 20:399 
agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons,62 while nuclear weapon 
states agreed “to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology 
and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons.”63  Parties used these non-
armament agreements to limit expansion of the nuclear arms 
threat and associated risks.  The NWFZ treaties provided area 
security for nations, while the NPT provided overall assurance that 
nuclear weapon states would not pass on their capabilities.64
B.  Confidence-Building Measures 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis65 in October 1962 highlighted the 
“imminence of nuclear war” among superpower leaders and 
“stimulated a new willingness to explore bilateral approaches to 
tension reduction and crisis management.”66
 
 62 See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 
  Additionally, the 
world watched and wondered about the potential risk of nuclear 
war, whether caused by accident, misunderstanding, or intentional 
acts of aggression.  In response to the public and political 
prominence of this life-threatening issue, two international 
47, art. II. 
 63 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 327. 
 64 After the international community had addressed the threat posed by the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons with the NPT, the related threat posed by the 
proliferation of missiles and missile technology was also recognized.  As a result, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987.  See MTCR, http:// 
www.mtcr.info/english/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).  The MTCR is a non-legally 
binding political arrangement among nations that are suppliers of missile technology who 
share the common goal of preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.  
Id.  Its current membership is 34 nations.  Id.  The Regime consists of a common export 
policy, set forth in the MTCR Guidelines, which is applied to a common list of controlled 
items, set forth in the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex, that represents virtually 
all of the equipment and technology that would be needed for missile development, 
production and operation.  Id.  Each member nation pledges to implement export controls 
on these items in accordance with their national legislation.  Id.  The United States has 
done so by means of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799 (2006).  Under 
the MTCR Guidelines, all missile and missile technology exports are to be subjected to a 
“case-by-case” review and all Category I exports—complete missile systems and major 
components thereof—are to be subjected to a “strong presumption” of denial.  MTCR 
Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, MTCR, http://www.mtcr 
.info/english/guidelines.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
 65 The Cuban Missile Crisis entailed thirteen days following the United States’ 
discovery of the Soviet Union’s strategic offensive missiles positioned in Cuba, and 
involved the U.S. naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba launched in response, 
which resulted in the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.  See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE 
OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1-2 (1971). 
 66 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at X. 
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agreements were established: the Hot Line Agreement and the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty.67
The confidence-building agreement known as the “Hot Line” 
Agreement of 1963 (the Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link)
 
68 
established an emergency link between the two superpowers.  This 
first bilateral agreement limited the risk of war by establishing a 
direct, rapid, and reliable emergency communications link 
between the Soviet Union and the United States for use during a 
“military crisis which might appear directly to threaten the security 
of either of the states involved and where such developments were 
taking place at a rate which appeared to preclude the use of 
normal consultative procedures.”69
In addition to stimulating the United States and Soviet Union 
to establish bilateral, confidence-building agreements, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, a watershed event, also generated arms-limitations 
measures.  This international crisis yielded increased public 
knowledge about and intensified global attention to the nature and 
effects of radioactive fallout and the potential for cumulative 
environmental contamination and resultant genetic damage.
 
70
C.  Arms-Limitation Agreements 
 
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis changed the arms-control 
negotiating context.  This decisive event added a sense of urgency 
and provided a more vivid perception of the risks and capabilities 
involved.  Public recognition of and concern regarding the threat 
of nuclear arms led to support for an international collective 
agreement. 
In the mid-1950s, fallout from U.S. and Soviet testing 
incidents caused radioactive debris to fall on a Japanese fishing 
 
 67 See Hot Line Agreement: Narrative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/ 
isn/4785.htm#narrative (last visited Feb. 2, 2012); Limited Test Ban Treaty: Narrative, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm#narrative (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
 68 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct 
Communications Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 472 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hot 
Line Agreement]. 
 69 ACDA, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting U.S., Working Paper on the Reduction of the 
Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication (Dec. 12, 
1962) (submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee)). 
 70 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 24. 
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vessel in the South Pacific (U.S. test) and Japan proper 
experienced “rain containing radioactive debris” (Soviet test).71  
As a result, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, 
China, and France began negotiating an agreement to end nuclear 
testing and established the arms-limitation measure known as the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 (Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water).72  Since then, a total of 116 parties have signed on to this 
treaty.73
The parties initially disagreed as to compliance verification 
provisions, including the system of controls and inspection.
 
74  This 
disagreement was motivated by concern about “clandestine 
violation[s],” due to a lack of verification capability or adequate 
seismic detectors to identify underground testing.75  The United 
States demanded “onsite inspection to detect covert testing, 
especially underground,” while the Soviets resisted onsite 
inspections.76  After high-level, three-power talks with the United 
States, Soviet Union, and France,77 President Kennedy suggested 
removing underground testing from the scope of the agreement 
and the parties overcame the stalemate over verification.78
Consequently, the LTBT prohibits nuclear testing or any 
other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, outer space, and under 
water, or anywhere else if it would result in “radioactive debris . . . 




 71 See id. at 29. 
  
According to Acting Secretary of State Ball, “[t]he phrase ‘any 
other nuclear explosion’ includ[ed] explosions for peaceful 
 72 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
 73 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 31. 
 74 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 25. 
 75 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 29-30.  The issue regarding detection of 
underground testing also delayed achieving consensus during the multilateral 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiation, but the parties gained confidence in 
verification capabilities with improved technology of seismic detectors.  Blechman 
Interview, supra note 56.  The parties ultimately achieved consensus and signed the CTBT 
in 1996.  History of the CTBT: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www 
.state.gov/t/avc/rls/159263.htm. 
 76 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XI. 
 77 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 30 (“In 1960, France conducted its first 
nuclear test in the Sahara Desert . . . .”). 
 78 See id. at 30. 
 79 ACDA, supra note 1, at 27. 
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purposes.’”80  The latter distinction attempted to avoid “the 
difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and 
peaceful explosions without additional controls.”81
IV.  1969–1979: BILATERAL APPROACH BEGINS 
 
A.  Non-Armament Agreements 
Following the LTBT in 1963, some global fear faded, risks 
became less obvious, civil defense drills stopped in the United 
States, and other international concerns rose to the forefront of 
the global agenda when nuclear weapons testing went 
underground.82  Nevertheless, scientific advancements in 
oceanographic technology, interest in the ocean floor as a 
resource, concern about potential disputes due to the absence of 
established rules of law, and fear that aggressive parties could use 
this new environment for military installations or nuclear weapons 
launching sites, led to the Seabed Treaty of 1971.83
Similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, Outer Space Treaty of 
1967, and NWFZ treaties, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof (Seabed Treaty)
 
84 is a non-armament treaty.  The parties 
faced difficulties in defining territorial waters, but ultimately 
agreed to a twelve-mile limit, corresponding with the definition of 
territorial sea in the Convention on the Territorial Sea.85
Prior to establishing an agreement, the parties also engaged in 




 80 Id. at 27 (quoting Acting Secretary of State Ball’s report to President Kennedy) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
  
The Soviets proposed verification measures similar to the Outer 
Space Treaty—with all installations and structures open to 
inspection when reciprocal rights are granted—but the United 
States opposed such a provision because the seabed, unlike the 
 81 Id. (quoting Acting Secretary of State Ball’s report to President Kennedy) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Graham Interview, supra note 45; Blechman Interview, supra note 56. 
 83 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 80. 
 84 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 955 U.N.T.S. 115. 
 85 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 284. 
 86 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 80. 
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moon, is fraught with national jurisdiction claims of the area.87  
The parties finally agreed to verification provisions which allowed 
the parties to use their own verification means, other parties’ 
assistance, or international procedures.  Thus, parties were given 
the ability to fulfill obligations without interfering with other, 
legitimate, seabed activities.88
B.  Confidence-Building Measures 
 
Between 1969 and 1979, the superpowers also established 
three bilateral confidence-building agreements: the Agreement on 
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(Accidents Measures Agreement) (1971);89 the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-USSR 
Direct Communications Link (“Hot Line” Modernization 
Agreement) (1971);90 and, the Prevention of Nuclear War 
Agreement (1973).91
With the Accident Measures Agreement (AMA) and the Hot 
Line Modernization Agreement, the parties attempted to reduce 
risks associated with nuclear arms.  By signing the AMA, the 
parties committed to: maintain and improve organizational and 
technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized nuclear 
weapons use; immediately notify the other country of any 
accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident involving 
possible nuclear weapon detonation which might cause a risk of 
nuclear war; and, to provide advanced notice of any planned 
missile launches beyond territorial limits in the other party’s 
direction.
  The two superpowers designed these 
agreements to build trust and confidence in each other. 
92
 
 87 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 
 
20, at 284. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 30, 
1971, 807 U.N.T.S. 57. 
 90 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, Sept. 
30, 1971, 806 U.N.T.S. 402.  Technological advancements in satellite communications since 
the 1963 Hot Line prompted the Hot Line Modernization Agreement, which established 
operation, equipment, and cost allocations to form two satellite communications circuits 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  See ACDA, supra note 1, at 91. 
 91 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, 24 U.N.T.S. 1478. 
 92 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 88. 
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In 1973, the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement again 
instituted procedures to ensure international cooperation and 
reduce the risk of nuclear war.  The Prevention Agreement, a 
bilateral agreement between the two superpowers, set forth a code 
of conduct, such as refraining from the threat or use of force 
toward the opposing signatory and toward third party countries to 
avoid nuclear war.  The agreement thereby had multilateral 
implications and imposed a commitment to consult in the event of 
nuclear confrontation.93
C.  Arms-Limitation Agreements 
 
Despite the “narrow avoidance of worldwide thermonuclear 
destruction” during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
resultant bilateral confidence-building agreements and arms-
limitations measures described above, the arms race between the 
two superpowers “spurred on.”94  In response, between 1969 and 
1972, the United States and Soviet Union convened the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) to address “this phenomenon 
of an all-out, uncontrolled, dangerous nuclear arms race.”95
By the late 1950s, both nations had developed and flight 
tested ballistic missiles with range and payload capabilities 
sufficient to deliver a nuclear weapon from each nation to the 
territory of the other.
 
96  These “intercontinental ballistic missiles” 
(ICBM) represented the mating of mankind’s most fearsome 
weapon, the nuclear weapon, to the most advanced weapon 
delivery system yet devised, the ICBM.97
 
 93 See id. at 128. 
  Each nuclear-armed 
missile was a weapon system of awesome destructive power.  Yet, 
as both the United States and the Soviet Union embarked on 
massive ICBM-production programs in the early 1960s, neither 
side felt significantly safer, due to the massive arsenal being built 
by their opponent.  Thus, each felt compelled to build and deploy 
more and more missiles.  By the late 1960s, each nation had over 
 94 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 36. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear U.S. and 
Soviet/Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 1959–2008, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 
Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 62, 64-66, available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/65/1/62.full 
.pdf+html. 
 97 See John B. Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, in JOHN NORTON 
MOORE ET. AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 551-60 (1990) (discussing the concept of the 
ICBM in greater detail). 
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one thousand nuclear-armed ICBMs aimed at the other.98
The escalating nuclear arms race was a source of growing 
concern to senior U.S. officials, as was the mounting evidence of 
Soviet construction of rudimentary anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
systems around Leningrad and Moscow.
 
99  Because of concern that 
an ABM race between these two nations could be strategically 
destabilizing, as well as concern over the mounting cost of the on-
going arms race, the two nations agreed to engage in offensive and 
defensive arms limitation talks.100  The result was the SALT talks 
which began in November 1969,101
The bilateral SALT I negotiations were focused on limiting 
strategic offensive and defensive weapons delivery vehicles.
 lasted three years, and 
produced three agreements: the Interim Agreement, the ABM 
Treaty, and SALT II. 
102  
SALT I resulted in two finalized agreements: (1) the Interim 
Agreement on Offensive Arms I (Interim Agreement) (1972);103 
and (2) the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) (1972).104  
The Interim Agreement restrained the rivalry between the United 
States and Soviet Union by limiting offensive strategic weaponry 
on land and submarine-based offensive nuclear weapons.105  The 
ABM Treaty limited ABM defensive systems (designed to 
intercept strategic ballistic missiles).106
The Interim Agreement was to remain in force for five years.  
 
 
 98 Id. at 63.  See also Fen Osler Hampson, SALT I: Interim Agreement and ABM 
Treaty, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 65, 71 
(Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds., 1987). 
 99 See Norris & Kristensen, supra note 96, at 66. 
 100 See id. at 68.  See also CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 28, at 15-16. 
 101 See Hampson, supra note 98, at 71.  See also CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 
28, at 11-13. 
 102 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 36; GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 306. 
 103 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter Interim 
Agreement]. 
 104 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. 
 105 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
 106 The ABM Treaty allows each party to have one ABM site to protect its capital city 
and another to protect its ICBM field, “limits ABM launchers, missiles, and radars, and 
restricts certain kinds of testing.”  1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 
10, at 19-20.  The 1974 ABM Treaty Protocol further reduced the number of ABM 
deployment areas to one site only.  See also ACDA, supra note 1, at 131. 
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It “essentially [froze]” the number of strategic ballistic missile 
launchers (operational and under construction) and allowed an 
increase in sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers “up to 
an agreed level, for each party only with the dismantling or 
destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM 
launchers.”107  While “modernization and replacement of 
[strategic] missiles were permitted . . . . launchers for light or older 
ICBMs could not be converted into launchers for modern heavy 
ICBMs.”108  The general terms, however, did not alleviate 
uncertainty regarding the amount of weapons in the Soviet 
arsenal.109  This agreement was intended to be a “freeze”—a 
temporary, stop-gap measure to hold strategic offensive arms at 
existing levels110 to give arms-control negotiators additional time 
to address the enormously difficult challenges associated with 
trying to produce a comprehensive nuclear arms limitation 
agreement.111
When they came to the negotiating table, the parties did not 
have symmetrical weapon systems or strategic forces, and their 
defense needs and requirements were materially different—i.e., 
the United States was obligated to defend overseas allies, while the 
Soviets had nearby allies.
 
112  Furthermore, “U.S. and Soviet 
offensive strategic forces differed [significantly from each other 
because of] . . . . historical, geographic,” and other reasons.113  
Since the United States had a “strong tradition of air and naval 
power,” the United States had advantages in heavy bombers and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).114  Since the Soviet 
Union had “a large land mass, it concentrated on the development 
and deployment of land-based strategic ballistic missiles.115
The Soviet Union [initially] sought to define as “strategic” any 
  The 
result was two strategic-force structures that were difficult to 
compare for arms limitation purposes.  In addition, 
 
 107 ACDA, supra note 1, at 121.  See also Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. III; 
1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 20. 
 108 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 29.  See also Interim Agreement, supra 
note 103, arts. IV, II. 
 109 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 43. 
 110 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 7-8. 
 111 See id. at 29. 
 112 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 308. 
 113 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 27. 
 114 Id. at 28. 
 115 Id. 
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U.S. or Soviet weapon system capable of reaching the territory 
of the other side.  This would have included U.S. forward-based 
systems, chiefly medium-range bombers based in Europe . . . 
[that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union] . . . [but] 
would have excluded Soviet intermediate-range [ballistic] 
missiles . . . aimed at Western Europe and . . . [incapable of] 
reach[ing] the United States.116
The Interim Agreement was also significant because it 
formalized the principle of non-interference with national 
technical means of verification.
 
117  A number of issues relating to 
the U.S.–Soviet strategic equation were, for a variety of reasons, 
not addressed by the Interim Agreement—such as strategic 
bombers, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and 
multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).118  An 
additional complication was the military commitments made to 
other nations and alliances—the United States to NATO, and the 
Soviet Union to the Warsaw Pact.  The parties decided, however, 
to leave these issues for subsequent arms control negotiations.119
The ABM Treaty was probably the most significant, and 
certainly the longest-lasting, of the SALT agreements.  While the 
offensive part of the strategic equation would take almost twenty 
years (until START was signed in 1991) to solve, the defensive part 
was solved via negotiation in a mere three years (1969–1972).  The 
ABM Treaty, which was signed and entered into force in 1972, 
limited the development, testing, and deployment of anti-ballistic 
missile, or ABM, systems—i.e., systems designed to counter or, 
“shoot down,” strategic ballistic missiles.
  
The Interim Agreement entered into force on October 3, 1972 and 
expired on October 2, 1977. 
120  The Treaty imposed 
limits on the number of ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars 
that both sides could deploy.121  It limited where those components 
could be deployed to each nation’s capital and at one ICBM field 
of each Party’s choosing.122
 
 116 Id. 
  The ABM Treaty also banned the 
 117 See Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. V. 
 118 See CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 28, at 29-39. 
 119 Rhinelander, supra note 97, at 603-10. 
 120 Id. at 588-95. 
 121 See ABM Treaty, supra note 104, art. III. 
 122 See id.  A 1974 Protocol to the Treaty reduced these two choices to one and called 
upon the Parties to pick which site they would defend.  Protocol to the Treaty Between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
SCHENCK & YOUMANS_Article (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2012  2:39 PM 
2012] NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL & NEW START 419 
development, testing, or deployment of “sea-based, air-based, 
space-based, or mobile land-based” ABM systems or 
components,123 thus expressing a clear preference for fixed and 
land-based ABM systems or components.  Such limitations 
supported the Treaty’s verification regime, which, like the Interim 
Agreement, also reflected the principle of non-interference with 
national technical means of verification.124  The ABM Treaty was 
unlimited in duration,125 subject to review every five years.126  Both 
sides had the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six months’ 
notice.127  The United States exercised its withdrawal right on 
December 13, 2001.128
In Article VII of the Interim Agreement of SALT I, the 
parties agreed to continue active negotiations regarding strategic 
offensive arms.  The SALT II negotiations began in 1972, guided 
by the goal of replacing the Interim Agreement “with a long-term 
comprehensive [t]reaty providing broad limits on strategic 
offensive weapons systems.”
  This decision, which became effective on 
June 13, 2002, removed a significant impediment to the 
development, testing, and deployment of U.S. missile defense 
programs. 
129  The SALT II Treaty130 represented 
a move beyond the arms “freeze” created by the Interim 
Agreement to a permanent treaty that would provide meaningful 
reductions in strategic offensive arms.  SALT II limited the total 
number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles held by each party to 
2,400 (and reduced to 2,250 after January 1, 1951).131
 
Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., arts. I-II, July 3, 1974, 27 
U.S.T. 1647.  The Soviet Union decided to defend Moscow while the United States chose 
to defend the ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota.  See ACDA, supra note 
  Within this 
aggregate ceiling, the parties agreed to limit launchers of ICBMs 
and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, air-to-surface ballistic missile 
1, at 
131. 
 123 ABM Treaty, supra note 104, art. V. 
 124 Id. art. XII. 
 125 Id. art. XV. 
 126 Id. art. XIV. 
 127 See id. art. XV, ¶ 2. 
 128 See ABM Treaty: U.S. Withdrawal Notice, ACQWEB (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.acq 
.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/ABMwithdrawal.htm. 
 129 ACDA, supra note 1, at 189. 
 130 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 96-1 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1138 [hereinafter SALT II]. 
 131 Id. art. III, ¶¶ 1-2. 
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equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for long-
range cruise missiles to no more than 1,320.132  Additional 
limitations included: maximum throw-weights and launch-weights 
of light and heavy ICBMs; a limit on the testing and deployment of 
one “new type” of ICBM; limits on the number of reentry vehicles 
on certain ICBMs and SLBMs; a ban on the testing and 
deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater 
than 600 kilometers; a ban on the construction of new ICBM 
launchers; a ban on heavy, mobile ICBMs and heavy SLBMs; and 
agreements on data exchanges and advance notification of certain 
ICBM test launches.133
U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet Chairman Leonid 
Brezhnev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) in Vienna, Austria, on June 
18, 1979.  The submission of SALT II to the U.S. Senate for 
ratification during the summer of 1979 resulted in a very 
contentious series of ratification hearings and substantial Senate 
opposition.
 
134  Prospects for Senate ratification were doomed 
when, in December 1979, Soviet military forces invaded 
Afghanistan.135
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter 
asked the Senate to suspend consideration of SALT II.
 
136  On July 
25, 1980, President Carter signed Presidential Directive 59,137 
which described the U.S. nuclear-war-fighting policy, including 
plans for conducting a limited nuclear war.138
 
 132 Id. art. V, ¶ 1. 
  The United States 
remained a signatory to SALT II and continued to abide by its 
numerical limits on strategic nuclear launch vehicles until late 
 133 See Dan Caldwell, From SALT to START: Limiting Strategic Nuclear Weapons, in 2 
ENCYLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 895-907 (Richard Dean Burns 
ed., 1993).  See also Stephen J. Flanagan, SALT II, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: 
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 105-34 (Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds., 
1987); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 32-35. 
 134 See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 903-07. 
 135 Id.  See also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 19-20. 
 136 See 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 29. 
 137 For the text of this directive, see Presidential Directive/NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy, JIMMY CARTER LIBR. & MUSEUM (July 25, 1980), http://www.jimmy 
carterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf. 
 138 See L. Hagen, Comments on Presidential Directive 59, 1980, in THE AMERICAN 
ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POLICIES FROM THE DISCOVERY OF 
FISSION TO THE PRESENT 210-11 (Philip L. Cantelon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991). 
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1986.139  Despite SALT II’s failure to enter into force, the Treaty 
represented pioneering concepts that were carried over into the 
subsequent START Treaty, such as the “existing type” concept as 
a means of determining accountability of the treaty over certain 
systems, focusing on launchers as a way of limiting ballistic 
missiles, and the formulation of warhead attribution rules designed 
to track the military capability of each covered system and to limit 
the testing activities that could be undertaken with each covered 
system.140
President Reagan, a 1979 member of the Committee on the 
Present Danger (an anti-SALT, anti-arms control, anti-Soviet, 
non-profit, private organization) and opponent of SALT in 1980,
 
141 
succeeded Carter and called for the modernization of nuclear 
defenses.142  Although he chose not to revive SALT II, President 
Reagan ensured that the United States did not deploy troops 
exceeding SALT II limits, as long as the Soviets did so, as well.143  
The Soviet Union also agreed to adhere to SALT II’s terms, and 
the un-ratified agreement continued to guide national policy for 
both parties.144
The Nuclear Freeze Movement arose in response to the 
Senate’s failure to ratify SALT II and Presidential Directive 59.  
The faction’s goals included urging the superpowers to freeze 
nuclear-weapons testing and production, missile deployment, and 
the development of new aircraft delivery systems.
 
145  The Freeze 
Movement gained substantial public support in the early 1980s, 
which led the Democratic Party to adopt the Freeze positions as 
part of its campaign platform in 1984.146
 
 139 See Caldwell, supra note 
 
133, at 907. 
 140 See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
art. III, ¶¶ 9, 6, 4, July 31, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter START 
I]. 
 141 See KENNETH L. ADELMAN, THE GREAT UNIVERSAL EMBRACE: ARMS 
SUMMITRY—A SKEPTIC’S ACCOUNT 251 (1989). 
 142 See 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XIII. 
 143 See id. at 29; ACDA, supra note 1, at 190. 
 144 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 190. 
 145 See DAVID ADAMS, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS 15 (electronic ed. 2002) 
(1985), available at http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6-15.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012); Blechman Interview, supra note 56. 
 146 See Lawrence S. Wittner, What Activists Can Learn from the Nuclear Freeze 
Movement, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 18, 2003, 1:38 PM), http://hnn.us/articles/1636 
.html. 
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Other arms-limitation agreements during this period—both of 
which were bilateral—included the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
(TTBT) (1974),147 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) 
Treaty (1976).148  President Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate 
scandal caused the TTBT to be “hastily thrown together in a 
month in Moscow at [Secretary of State] Kissinger’s urging, to give 
Nixon something to sign at the 1974 Summit,” one month before 
Nixon’s resignation.149  Consequently, the TTBT did not address 
peaceful nuclear explosions, considered “a pie in the sky.”150  The 
PNE followed after two more years of negotiations, delayed 
mainly because the Soviets initially held fast to the idea of using 
nuclear explosions to dig a major canal.151
These companion agreements filled the void remaining after 
the LTBT, which only addressed above-ground testing limits.  
Together, the TTBT and PNE “extended the limited test ban to 
underground tests—whether of weapons or ‘peaceful’ devices—of 
more than 150 kilotons.”
 
152  The TTBT prohibited underground 
tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons (approximately 150,000 
tons of TNT), and thus set forth “a nuclear threshold,’”153 limiting 
the explosive force of any new nuclear warheads and bombs.154  
The PNE provided the same restrictions on peaceful underground 
nuclear explosions for civilian development projects.155
 
 147 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 
3, 1974, S. TREATY DOC. No. 101-19 (1990) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1990) [hereinafter 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty]. 
 
 148 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 
28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 891, 1714 U.N.T.S. 432 [hereinafter Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
Treaty]. 
 149 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 61. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XII. 
 153 ACDA, supra note 1, at 133. 
 154 See Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 147, art. I, ¶ 1. 
 155 See Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, supra note 148, art. III, ¶ 2; 1985 NUCLEAR 
ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 22.  The subsequent protocol to the PNE 
Treaty “provided for limited onsite inspection under very specific circumstances.”  Id. 
Although not directly related to nuclear arms control, two other agreements were signed 
during the period from 1969 to 1979.  Pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), opened for 
signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, a multilateral agreement signed in 1972, parties 
agreed to stop “develop[ing], produc[ing], stockpil[ing], or acquir[ing] biological agents or 
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The TTBT and PNE served to limit the expanding weapons 
technology by restricting or ‘capping’ the explosive force of the 
weapons.  As they had done before, the parties used agreement to 
restrain the threat of nuclear arms and arms capabilities.  Thus, by 
limiting weapons capabilities, the parties were able to stem the 
growth of the nuclear arms threat.156
V.  1980–1991: REPOSITIONING 
 
A.  Confidence-Building Measures 
Several confidence-building measures (some multilateral, 
others bilateral), designed to reduce the risk of war, were 
established from 1980 to 1991. 
In 1980, the multilateral Nuclear Material Convention157: (1) 
provided minimum physical-protection levels for the international 
transport of nuclear material; (2) set forth “a general framework 
for cooperation among states in the protection, recovery, and 
return of stolen nuclear material”; and (3)  listed certain offenses 
for which offenders would be subject to extradition or 
prosecution.158




toxins ‘of types [and qualities] . . . no[t] justifi[ed] for prophylactic, protective, and other 
peaceful purposes,’ as well as weapons and means of delivery.”  ACDA, supra note 
 
upgraded the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Hot Line, increasing communications 
equipment speed and adding facsimile and graphic material 
1, at 
96.  In 1977, under the multilateral Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Environmental 
Modification Convention), opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 
U.N.T.S. 151, parties agreed not to use climate modification techniques for military or 
hostile purposes even if such techniques became feasible in the future.  See ACDA, supra 
note 1, at 153. 
 156 Kenneth Adelman, U.N. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (1983–87) for President Reagan, asserts otherwise, stating that 
“halting nuclear testing would actually increase the number of nuclear weapons and make 
future nuclear arms less safe . . . . No one advocates stopping the testing of ships or guns or 
planes—indeed, we would never purchase a car that had not been fully tested . . . .”  
ADELMAN, supra note 141, at 31. 
 157 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 125. 
 158 ACDA, supra note 1, at 218. 
 159 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics to Expand the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, July 17, 1984, 
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/hotexpa.htm. 
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transmission capability.160
With the 1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement,
 
161 
the United States and the Soviet Union established centers 
connected by facsimile to supplement communications between 
the nations.  The Agreement also provided the capacity for 
government-to-government notifications, communications, and 
information exchanges required by other arms control and 
confidence-building agreements.162
In 1986, further measures were established “to increase 
openness and predictability about military activities in Europe, 
with the aim of reducing the risk of armed conflict” there.
 
163  State 
members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, including the United States, Soviet Union, France, and 
United Kingdom, drafted the Document of the Stockholm 
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the 
Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid 
Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.164  The Document established notification, observation, 
forecasting, and onsite inspection procedures for military activities 
(exceeding a certain number of troops) in Europe.165
In 1988, the superpowers agreed to another confidence-





 160 See ACDA, supra note 
  This bilateral treaty attempted to limit the risk of 
nuclear war, due to “misinterpretation, miscalculation, or 
accident,” by requiring parties to provide advance notification 
prior to launching intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
1, at 228. 
 161 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept. 
15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 76. 
 162 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 246. 
 163 Id. at 231. 
 164 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant 
Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190 (entered into force Jan. 
1, 1987). 
 165 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 232. 
 166 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 31, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1200. 
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submarine-launched ballistic missiles.167
B.  Arms-Limitation Agreements 
 
The Reagan Administration reformulated the existing 
negotiations scheme into the 1982–1991 Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty (INF) (1987), which were designed “to limit the actual 
weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill people,’ as 
distinguished from the . . . approach of the Nixon, Ford, Carter 
administrations, which only limited the delivery vehicles—missiles 
and bombers.”168
[H]ad used launchers (i.e., ICBM silos, SLBM tubes, and 
bombers) as the object of . . . limitation . . . to a certain degree 
because of monitoring capabilities.  However, the advent of 
deploying multiple warheads on missiles . . . had reduced the 
relevance of this measure.  To the Reagan administration, it 
was essential to address the weapons themselves, especially the 
highly accurate ICBM warheads.
  SALT I & II: 
169
The first years of these negotiations achieved little progress, 
in part because of the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces in Europe.
 
170  This weapons installation not only 
represented a major distraction from the task of limiting strategic 
arms, but also had a chilling effect on U.S.–Soviet relations.171  The 
pace and progress of strategic arms negotiations between these 
two nations gained traction in the mid-1980s.172  In 1983, President 
Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, which called 
for development of a missile defense system that would render 
nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”173  In 1985, President 
Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev met for the first time at the 
Geneva Summit, and established a personal relationship that 
would prove enormously important later on.174
 
 167 ACDA, supra note 
  Significantly, they 
1, at 347. 
 168 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 58.  Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. asserts that the 
Reagan approach is the same as the Interim Agreement and SALT II because “warheads 
are counted on the basis of their association with missiles and the missiles on the basis of 
their association with launchers . . . .”  Id. 
 169 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 31. 
 170 See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 908. 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. at 908-09. 
 173 Id. at 908. 
 174 See id. at 909. 
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“agreed that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
fought.’”175  Additionally, they affirmed their mutual goals of 
working towards an INF accord and limiting strategic offensive 
arms.176
Reagan and Gorbachev met again in October 1986 at the 
Reykjavik Summit for what would be a meeting characterized by 
“dramatic and far-reaching [arms control] proposals.”
 
177  By the 
end of the meeting, the two sides had agreed on an outline for a 
START Treaty contemplating reductions in strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles to 1,600 and a ceiling on deployed nuclear 
warheads of 6,000.178  “[T]he Reykjavik Summit was the true 
watershed of modern arms control”179 when the Soviet Union 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Reagan 
became “negotiators-in-chief,”180 agreeing “to equal global ceilings 
of systems capable of carrying 100 INF missile warheads, none of 
which would be deployed in Europe. . . . [and the Soviets] 
proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments . . . .”181  
The INF was a success story that evolved from the Reykjavik 
Summit because Gorbachev agreed in principle to the INF’s 
intrusive on-site inspection provisions.182
In 1987, the parties signed the INF arms-limitation agreement.  
In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had decided to forward-deploy 
the SS-20 missile—an intermediate-range missile with three 
nuclear warheads capable of striking the capitals of Western 
Europe.
 
183  The resulting international tensions, which were 
complicated by a growing European peace movement, moved 
NATO to call for a “‘dual track’ strategy”184
 
 175 Id. 
 to deal with this 
threat: arms control negotiations between the United States and 
Soviet Union, combined with the deployment of U.S. Pershing II 
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, both of which were 
 176 See id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See id. at 909-10. 
 179 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 124. 
 180 ADELMAN, supra note 141, at 63. 
 181 ACDA, supra note 1, at 253. 
 182 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 125. 
 183 See Janne E. Nolan, The INF Treaty: Eliminating Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Missiles, 1987 to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND 
DISARMAMENT 955-64 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993). 
 184 ACDA, supra note 1, at 252. 
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nuclear-armed.185  The arms control negotiations began in 
December 1981 and had to overcome numerous obstacles, 
disagreements, and one Soviet walk-out.186  Nonetheless, they 
eventually led to agreement on what was referred to as the 
“double-zero” option: the complete elimination of all 
intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles.187  The 
resultant INF Treaty188  required each party to destroy its 500- and 
5,500-kilometer ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, as 
well as associated launchers, support structures, and equipment.189  
Within a three-year elimination period—commencing on June 1, 
1988, the date the Treaty entered into force—the two sides 
eliminated all Pershing II and SS-20 missiles and other systems 
covered by the Treaty.190
The INF Treaty was ground-breaking in the history of arms 
control negotiations between the nuclear superpowers because it 
gave both sides their first experience with on-site inspection—a 
verification technique that was almost unthinkable at the time in 
the Cold War.  Other firsts attributed to the INF Treaty were 
establishment of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the 
capitals of both sides and the routine exchange of launch 
notifications—accomplished through those Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers—for missile launches permitted by the INF 




VI.  1991–2009: START IN FORCE 
  Its most significant accomplishment, however, was 
eliminating an entire class of weapons—intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles. 
In December 1987, Gorbachev came to Washington to sign 
the INF Treaty and the parties announced an agreement on the 
START framework.  The two sides would still need several years 
to resolve the remaining issues, most notably the implications 
 
 185 See Nolan, supra note 183. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id. 
 188 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-11 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty]. 
 189 ACDA, supra note 1, at 252. 
 190 See id. at 252. 
 191 INF Treaty, supra note 188, art. VII, ¶ 12, art. XIII, ¶ 2. 
SCHENCK & YOUMANS_Article (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2012  2:39 PM 
428 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 20:399 
posed by the new U.S. effort on missile defense.192  U.S. President 
George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev finally signed 
the START Treaty (START I) on July 31, 1991.193
START I obligated the superpowers to notify each other of 
any ICBM or SLBM flight test, including those into the upper 
atmosphere or space.
 
194  The Treaty also allowed for the 
deployment of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with 6,000 
accountable warheads.195  Of these, only 4,900 could be deployed 
on missiles, and of these 4,900 warheads, only 1,100 could be 
deployed on mobile ICBMs.196  The reductions called for by 
START I were to be carried out in three phases over seven years 
so that the final 1,600/6,000 numbers were arrived at seven years 
after entry into force.197  Pursuant to START I, the parties 
adopted a verification regime similar to that contained in the INF 
Treaty regarding data exchanges, on-site inspection, launch 
notifications, and respect for national technical means of 
verification.198  A major difference was START I’s rules on 
telemetry encryption, not present in the INF Treaty, which were 
designed to prevent both sides from developing and testing new 
strategic missiles without notifying the other side.199
Compared to the very limited achievements of the Interim 
Agreement and the SALT II, START I was a major success.  It 
was the first arms control agreement between the United States 
and Soviet Union that required the elimination of almost 50% of 
the deployed warheads both sides possessed.  START I was 
limited in duration to 15 years, with a provision allowing the 
parties to extend the Treaty for successive 5-year periods.
 
200
Less than a month after START I had been signed, a group of 
hard-line Soviet Government officials tried to overthrow the 
government of President Gorbachev.
  While 




 192 Id. 
  Although unsuccessful, 
 193 See START I, supra note 140. 
 194 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 347. 
 195 START I, supra note 140, art. II. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. arts. VIII-XII. 
 199 Id. art. X. 
 200 Id. art. XVII. 
 201 Caldwell, supra note 133, at 911. 
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this attempted coup showed how tumultuous the Soviet 
Government was behind the scenes and the fragility of President 
Gorbachev’s hold on power.  This culminated in an unexpected 
development that greatly complicated the entry into force of the 
START Treaty: the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  This 
surprising event, which occurred in December 1991, raised 
significant questions about the status, and even the viability, of 
START I. 
The May 1992 Lisbon Protocol202 addressed these questions 
when four nations—Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the 
Russian Federation—agreed to assume the former Soviet Union’s 
START Treaty obligations.203  START I was still viable but 
became a multilateral, rather than bilateral, treaty.  In addition, 
Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan pledged to remove all nuclear 
weapons from their soil and return them to the Russian 
Federation.204  These three nations subsequently joined the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.205
Despite the clarity the Lisbon Protocol provided, the START 
Treaty did not enter into force until December 5, 1994.  This delay 
occurred largely due to the time required for the three nations to 
complete the process of joining the NPT.
 
206
Soon after START was signed, President George H.W. Bush 
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a follow-on treaty, 
known as START II, on January 3, 1993.
  As a result, START 
I’s seven-year reduction period, as well as the Treaty’s fifteen-year 
duration, began on that date.  In addition to the strategic arms 
limitation and reduction efforts taking place within the Treaty’s 
mechanisms, further arms control efforts were taking place outside 
of the START Treaty. 
207
 
 202 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 23, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-32 (1992) [hereinafter Lisbon 
Protocol]. 
  START II was 
intended to build on the strategic arms reductions achieved 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 The Lisbon Protocol at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.armscontrol 
.org/node/3289 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 207 Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-
Russ., Jan. 3, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter START II]. 
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pursuant to START I by moving toward greater reductions.208  
Total deployed warheads were to be reduced from 6,000 under 
START I to around 3,500.209  Also, ICBMs with MIRVed 
warheads were banned, although SLBMs with MIRVs were 
permitted.210  START II did not enter into force, however, because 
the Russian Duma’s ratification of START II was made 
conditional on the U.S. Senate approving certain agreements that 
the United States and Russian Federation had negotiated to 
update the ABM Treaty.211  This approval never occurred because 
of strong opposition in the Senate to the ABM Treaty.212  
Accordingly, on June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty had become effective, the Russian 
Federation announced their withdrawal from START II.213
The Russian Federation’s decision to withdraw from START 
II had little practical consequence because of the Treaty of 
Moscow (also known as SORT).
 
214  This Treaty—signed by 
President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin on May 
24, 2002—called for reductions in strategic offensive weapons far 
beyond those described in START II: total deployed nuclear 
warheads were to be reduced to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by 
December 31, 2012.215  The parties agreed that all the other 
provisions of the 1991 START Treaty would remain in effect, 
including the verification regime.216  This two-page Treaty filled 
the void left by the demise of START II and carried the 
SALT/START process forward to the New START Treaty,217
 
 208 See id. pmbl. (“Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in 
doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and 
limitations provided for in the START Treaty . . . .”). 
 
which was designed to take the place of the then-expired START 
 209 Id. art. I. 
 210 Id. art. II. 
 211 See U.S.–Russian Treaties & Agreements, NTI, http://216.109.75.135/f_wmd411/ 
f1b2_2.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 212 See id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-8 
(2002) [hereinafter SORT]. 
 215 Id. art. I. 
 216 Id. art. II. 
 217 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, art. XIV, 
¶ 4, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-5 (2010) [hereinafter New START 
Treaty]. 
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Treaty and supersede the Treaty of Moscow upon its entry into 
force.218
In addition to the START I and II Treaty negotiations taking 
place, on May 31, 2003, President George W. Bush unveiled the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led, “global effort 
that aims to stop [the] trafficking of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from 
states and non-state actors [that are] of proliferation concern.”
 
219  
Its legal status is as a non-legally-binding political arrangement 
among like-minded nations seeking to prevent WMD proliferation 
through proactive means, including interdiction.220
PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
  When a nation 
endorses the , they commit 
to: (1) “interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors 
of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal 
authorities;” (2) “develop procedures to facilitate exchange of 
information with other countries;” (3) “strengthen national legal 
authorities to facilitate interdiction; and” (4) “take specific actions 
in support of interdiction efforts.”221
More than 90 nations have joined the PSI’s voluntary, non-
treaty-based regime.
 
222  This commitment reflects the international 
community’s desire to prevent “WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials” from falling into the hands of nations of concern 
or terrorists.223  In effect, the PSI calls upon the international 
community to use already-available legal tools to enforce their 
shared non-proliferation goals.224
 
 218 The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009.  See supra note 
 
12.  See also New 
START Treaty, supra note 217, art. XIV, ¶ 4. 
 219 Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ 
c10390.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Another international regime that emerged during this time intended to promote 
global peace and security was the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (HCOC), adopted in November 2002.  See Hague Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/ 
isn/trty/101466.htm (last updated Oct. 2011) [hereinafter HCOC].  Its goal is to bolster 
efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide through commitments, such as 
providing pre-launch notifications of missile launches, and through transparency 
measures, such as annual declarations on ballistic missile launches during the preceding 
year.  Id.  The HCOC was envisioned as a supplement to the MTCR without the more 
stringent membership process found in the MTCR.  See supra note 64, for a discussion of 
the MTCR.  HCOC membership is unrestricted and is currently over 125 nations.  See 
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VII.  2009–PRESENT: START EXPIRES AND THE NEW START 
TREATY ARRIVES 
The START Treaty expired by its own terms at midnight 
December 4, 2009.225  The United States and Russian Federation 
had previously announced their desire to conclude a follow-on 
treaty to replace START, but the negotiations were not concluded 
until after START had expired.226
The New START Treaty consists of the basic Treaty text, the 
Protocol containing additional rights and obligations, and a series 
of Technical Annexes.
  On April 8, 2010, Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, signaling a 
new chapter in the SALT/START process. 
227  This new Treaty reduces deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles to 700 within seven years after it enters into force.228  This 
is nearly 75% lower than the START Treaty warhead level and 
30% lower than the level the Treaty of Moscow prescribed.229  
Within that Treaty limit, each Party has the ability to determine its 
own force structure.230  Similar to the START Treaty’s verification 
regime, New START includes provisions for on-site inspections, 
exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications, as well as exchanges 
of telemetry.231  In certain respects, the verification regime is not as 
extensive as was the verification regime under START.  For 
example, the exchanges of telemetry between the Parties will be 




This reflects, among other things, the existence of a new 
 225 U.S.–Russian Treaties & Agreements, supra note 211. 
 226 See Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement by the Delegations of the 
Russian Federation and the U.S. on New Start Treaty (May 13, 2010), http://www.state 
.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141827.htm.  See also Gallery: Negotiating New START, DEF. 
TREATY INSPECTION READINESS PROGRAM, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/NC/gallery/newstart 
.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). 
 227 See Press Release, White House, Key Facts About the New START Treaty (Mar. 
26, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-
start-treaty. 
 228 New START Treaty, supra note 217, art. II. 
 229 See Press Release, White House, supra note 227. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See New START Treaty, supra note 217, arts. XI, VII, IX. 
 232 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, U.S.-Russ., pt. 7, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/140047.pdf. 
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relationship between the United States and the Russian 
Federation. 
On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate approved a 
Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty by a vote of 
71 to 26.233  The ratification hearings were very contentious, 
reflecting concerns over Russian treaty compliance, missile 
defense, and nuclear stockpiles.234  Those concerns were discussed 
in the Resolution of Ratification, which includes provisions calling 
for a Presidential certification that U.S. national technical means 
of verification are sufficient to warn of any Russian preparation to 
“break out” of the limits of the Treaty and a Presidential 
certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the 
Treaty.235  The Russian Duma approved ratification of the New 
START on January 25, 2011, and the formal instruments of 
ratification were exchanged on February 5, 2011, at which time the 
New START Treaty entered into force, for a duration of ten 
years.236
VIII.  BACK TO THE FUTURE: WHERE WILL WE GO WITH 
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL? 
   
If the New START Treaty should expire after its ten-year 
duration has run its course, what will happen next?  While it is 
difficult to predict the future of the SALT/START process, there 
are some predictable paths that might be chosen.  For example, the 
process could take a more multilateral approach to nuclear arms 
control.  A ‘Post-New START Treaty’ could seek to include 
additional parties, perhaps beginning with the United Kingdom 
and France, and possibly including the People’s Republic of China, 
India, and Pakistan—Israel and North Korea would likely not be 
interested. 
Alternatively, a more expansive approach to nuclear arms 
control could occur.  Critics of the New START point out the 
Treaty’s failure to address tactical nuclear weapons.237
 
 233 156 CONG. REC. S10982 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 5185224. 
  The 
 234 See, e.g., Senate Votes on New START Treaty, McCain and DeMint Lead Opposition 
by Gregory Hilton, DC WORLD AFF. BLOG (Sept. 15, 2010), http://diplomatdc.word 
press.com/2010/09/15/senate-votes-on-new-start-treaty-on-thursday-mccain-and-demint-
lead-opposition-by-gregory-hilton. 
 235 156 CONG. REC. S10982-83 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 518224 at **3. 
 236 New START Treaty, supra note 217, art. XIV. 
 237 See Ariel Cohen, The New START Ratification: Russia Tactical Nuke Advantage 
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Senate’s Resolution of Ratification required a Presidential 
certification that the United States would initiate negotiations with 
the Russian Federation regarding an agreement to limit tactical 
nuclear weapons.238
The future could also bring continued reductions in deployed 
nuclear weapons.  But just how low can the United States and 
Russian Federation go?  The United States won World War II in 
the Pacific with two nuclear weapons.
  A future Post-New START Treaty could also 
address limits on non-deployed nuclear warheads—warheads that 
START and New START left unconstrained.  This was likely 
done because, in a nuclear exchange, there would not be sufficient 
time to retrieve warheads from their storage facilities and mount 
them on ICBMs in time to launch them at the enemy.  As warhead 
levels drop, the warheads kept in storage could become more 
significant in the military equation, depending on where they were 
stored and how difficult it would be (with advances in missile 
technology) to install them on missiles. 
239  But, the NPT establishes 
an international goal of “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date” followed by “general and complete disarmament.”240
The SALT/START process has not been without flaws, or 
without critics.  As the United States and Russian Federation 
move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, one can 
question whether mature nations such as these continue to need an 
arms control treaty to guide their actions.  One could also question 
the extent to which the SALT and START Treaties contributed to 
keeping the peace between the nuclear superpowers over the past 
forty years.  Clearly other factors were at work—e.g., the military 
might of both sides, skilled and diligent diplomacy, each side’s 
growing economic interests in the other, and the fact that both 
sides were rational adversaries of one another.  Nevertheless, if the 
SALT and START Treaties made even the slightest contribution 
to preventing a nuclear war, then that may be reason enough for 
this process to continue. 
  
This suggests that additional reductions remain possible. 
Arms control negotiations have moved from focusing on 
 
Should Caution the Senate, FOUNDRY BLOG (Dec. 1, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://blog.heritage 
.org/2010/12/01/the-new-start-ratification-russia-tactical-nuke-advantage-should-caution-
the-senate. 
 238 156 CONG. REC. S10982 (daily ed. Dec, 22, 2010), 2010 WL 5185224. 
 239 See GAILEY, supra note 2. 
 240 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 47, art. VI. 
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comprehensive disarmament (1925–1958), to attempts at 
implementing partial measures (1959–1968), to bilateral talks 
(1969–1979), to reassessment and repositioning by the United 
States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1980–1991), to the 
present situation—the United States working with the Russian 
Federation to achieve strategic arms reductions (1991–present).  
Essentially, nuclear arms control negotiations continue to be an 
activity for the superpowers.  Perhaps, limiting the response to this 
global problem to the superpowers, rather than attempting global 
collective action, is the way of the future.  In any case, the key 
players continue to be responsible for crafting a response, albeit 
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